Railway Mania

Railways: How the Iron Road Changed the World

Course 41 · Chapter 4 · Railway Mania

Railways: How the Iron Road Changed the World 3 ended with the Liverpool and Manchester Railway proving that a public steam railway could pay. This chapter follows what happened next: a rush of investment in the 1840s that built thousands of miles of line, ruined many investors and left Britain with most of its main network. As before, dates, figures and "firsts" are flagged "check".

How a Railway Got Built

In Britain a company could not simply lay track across other people's land. Each railway needed its own private Act of Parliament, granting the right to raise capital, buy land compulsorily and build a defined route. The process was slow and costly: surveyors had to deposit plans, rival landowners, canal companies and other railways could object, and committees of both Houses heard evidence (check the details of the procedure). Promoters paid for lawyers, surveyors and engineers before a single sod was cut, so the Act itself was a financial asset.

Money came from the public. Shares were sold in instalments, called calls, so that an investor paid a small deposit up front and the balance later as construction needed it. That made shares cheap to buy and easy to speculate on, and it also meant a shareholder could owe far more than the deposit once the company called for the rest (check how liability worked for shareholders).

The Boom, 1844 to 1847

By the early 1840s the early main lines were paying good dividends, and the Liverpool and Manchester pattern looked like a licence to print money. Interest rates were low, ordinary savers had few attractive places to put their money, and newspapers and new railway journals publicised each scheme. The result was a wave of proposed companies. The mania is usually dated from around 1844 to 1847, with its peak in 1845 and 1846 (check the exact dates).

Parliament passed many railway Acts in these years. One web source gives 263 Acts in 1846 and another gives 272, so the exact count is uncertain (check). Routes totalling several thousand miles were authorised, and many of the schemes were duplicated, impractical or never meant to be built.

Year (check each)What was happening
1844Railway Regulation Act sets minimum standards for passenger fares and services (the "Parliamentary trains" provision) and gives the state some powers over new lines
1845Speculation accelerates; hundreds of new schemes are announced, and a flood of plans is deposited for the next parliamentary session
1846Peak of the Acts passed (roughly 260 to 270); Railway Regulation (Gauge) Act, the subject of Chapter 5
1847Credit tightens, share prices fall, and calls on shares become hard to pay; many schemes are abandoned

Speculators and the Crash

Many buyers had no intention of owning a railway. They bought allotments of shares in a new scheme, hoping to sell them at a premium before the next call fell due; these speculators were called "stags". Some promoters sold shares in companies with no realistic prospect of building anything, and some directors paid dividends out of capital to keep share prices high (check how widespread this was). A number of Members of Parliament held railway shares or sat on boards, which raised obvious concerns about conflicts of interest (one economics paper examines this, check).

The bubble burst from 1845 into 1847 as the Bank of England raised interest rates, a poor harvest and food imports drained gold, and shareholders were faced with calls they could not meet. Share prices fell sharply, some people were ruined, and many authorised lines were never built or were built years later in reduced form (check the timing and the causes, which historians weigh differently). Importantly, the crash did not destroy the railways: lines that were under construction were mostly completed, and the investment boom left a national network far larger than the one that existed in 1844.

The idea in one line Railway Mania was a financial bubble that overbuilt on borrowed optimism, but it also paid for a large part of the physical network, so the same event is a story of both ruin and lasting infrastructure.

George Hudson, the "Railway King"

The best-known figure of the period was George Hudson, a York draper who became a railway promoter, an MP and a chairman of several companies, gaining control of lines that fed into York and around the north and east of England. In 1849 revelations about his accounting practices, including paying dividends from capital and dealing in shares in ways that favoured himself, ended his career and he was driven from his posts (check the details and the scale of the fraud). He is a standard example of the way in which the speculative atmosphere rewarded the bold and blurred the boundary between business and misconduct.

The Navvies

The lines were built by hand. The labourers who dug the cuttings, raised the embankments and drove the tunnels were called navvies, a short form of "navigators" from the canal builders of the previous century (see Railways: How the Iron Road Changed the World 1). They were gangs of men, many from rural Britain and Ireland, who moved from site to site. One web source says that about a quarter of a million navvies were working on some 3,000 miles of line in 1845, but it is a single secondary source (check the figure).

The work was dangerous. Tools were picks, shovels, wheelbarrows and horse-drawn carts, supplemented by black-powder blasting in rock, and accidents, disease and poor housing in temporary camps were common. Pay was relatively good for manual work but was often delivered through truck systems or the contractor's own shops, which cut its real value (check). Contractors took on sections of line for fixed prices and engaged the gangs, so the engineer designed and supervised while the contractor and the navvies delivered. Communities near the works often feared the arrival of large numbers of unattached men, and the navvies earned a reputation for hard drinking and fighting that was partly deserved and partly prejudice (check the balance).

Role (check each)WhoWhat they did
PromoterLandowners, solicitors, merchantsPlanned the line, raised capital, steered the Bill through Parliament
EngineerStephenson, Brunel, Locke and othersSurveyed the route, designed the works, supervised the build
ContractorFirms such as Thomas Brassey's (check)Took on sections of the line for a price and hired the labour
NavvyItinerant labourersDug, hauled and built by hand
InvestorGentry, professionals, small savers, speculatorsBought shares, paid calls, took the risk

Finance Meets Engineering

Finance and engineering pulled against each other. Engineers wanted gentle gradients, big cuttings and tunnels and wide curves; promoters, under pressure to keep capital costs down and win parliamentary support, often wanted cheaper and shorter routes. Estimates made to impress Parliament and shareholders were frequently optimistic, and costs ran over (check some examples). Because Acts fixed the route and sometimes the amount of capital, a company that ran out of money could not easily change plan. That tension between what is built, what it costs and what was promised is familiar to anyone who has watched a software project.

Did you know The word "stag" for a speculator who applies for shares only to sell them at once comes from this period, and it is still used in finance for new share issues (check the earliest use).
Modern parallel Railway Mania resembles the dot-com boom: a transformative technology with real long-term value, a flood of copycat ventures, investors buying the story rather than the business, and a crash that wiped out many companies while leaving the infrastructure (then track, now fibre and data centres) in place for the survivors. A support engineer will also recognise the pattern of a big launch built on optimistic estimates.
Watch out It is tempting to say the mania "built the railways" or, equally, that it was "all fraud". Neither is accurate. Many lines were sound and useful, many shares fell because of tightening credit as much as because of dishonesty, and several historians question how irrational the market really was (one paper asks whether it was irrationality or accounting distortion). Treat any single-cause account with caution.
Verified / Not Yet Verified Verified by a web search for this chapter: the Railway Regulation Act 1844 took effect on 1 January 1845; a source gives 263 Acts for new railway companies in 1846 and another gives 272, so the count is uncertain; a source states that Parliament had sanctioned about 2,816 miles of new construction by July 1845; and the Railway (Gauge) Act dates from 1846. Not verified: the navvy figure (a single secondary source), the details of Hudson's career and fall, the causes and timing of the crash, the shareholder-liability rules and the origin of "stag". Those come from general knowledge, so treat every "(check)" accordingly.

Exercises

Exercise 1

Explain why a railway in 1840s Britain needed a private Act of Parliament, and describe how the system of calls on shares made speculation easy.

Exercise 2

Give three reasons why the bubble burst in 1845 to 1847, and explain why the crash did not leave Britain without a railway network.

Exercise 3

Using the roles table in this chapter, describe how an engineer, a contractor and a navvy each fit into building a line, and name one conflict between finance and engineering. Then give a modern example of the same conflict.

Coming up Chapter 5 turns to standards: Brunel's broad gauge against Stephenson's standard gauge, the Gauge Commission, and the cost of getting interoperability wrong.

Quick Reference

  • Private Act: each railway needed its own Act of Parliament for powers, capital and land
  • Calls: shares paid in instalments, cheap to buy and easy to speculate on
  • Peak: 1845 to 1846, roughly 260 to 270 Acts in 1846 (sources differ)
  • Crash: 1847 credit squeeze, falling prices, unmet calls; George Hudson fell in 1849
  • Navvies: hand-built the lines under contractors; dangerous, itinerant work