Taiwan & Cross-Strait Political Relations
Chinese Political History II: Reform, Opening & the Rise of Modern China
Chapter 9 · Taiwan & Cross-Strait Political Relations
Chapter 8 ended with Taiwan's rejection of "one country, two systems." This chapter looks at why the status of Taiwan is unresolved, how different governments phrase their positions, and how relations between the two sides have moved between contact and confrontation since the 1990s. The subject is contested and language matters, so the chapter separates what each side says from what the sources establish, and notes where I have not been able to verify a point.
Where the Dispute Comes From
Taiwan passed from Japan to the Republic of China (ROC) in 1945. After losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the ROC government retreated to Taiwan (see Chinese Political History I Chapter 6). Since then the ROC has exercised authority over the island, while the People's Republic of China (PRC) claims Taiwan as "an inalienable province of China" on a theory of state succession, and asserts itself as the sole legitimate Chinese government under its "one China principle." The sources I read describe the ROC's position and Taiwan's domestic divisions as complex, and they place the dispute at the center of relations between China and the United States and between China and Japan.
"One China": Three Different Things
| Term | Who uses it | What it says |
|---|---|---|
| One China principle | The PRC and a number of other states | There is one China; the PRC is its sole legitimate government; Taiwan is part of it. |
| One China policy | The United States, described as "strategic ambiguity" | In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué the US "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China" and "does not challenge that position." |
| "One country, two systems" | The PRC's proposal for unification | Taiwan would keep separate systems within China. Taiwan has consistently rejected it (Chapter 8). |
From Talks to Standoff: A Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Oct–Nov 1992 | Quasi-governmental talks between the SEF and ARATS, led by Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan, produce the "1992 Consensus": "both sides of the strait upheld the position of one China," with different interpretations. The 1993 Wang–Koo summit followed. |
| March 2005 | The 10th National People's Congress passes the Anti-Secession Law, which "authorized military action if Taiwan were to declare formal independence." |
| 2008–2016 | Under Ma Ying-jeou, elected on 22 March 2008, the two sides sign 23 agreements and hold eleven high-level talks. The approach is described as a shift "from 'mutual non-recognition' to 'mutual non-denial.'" |
| 7 Nov 2015 | Xi Jinping and Ma meet in Singapore, "the first meeting between leaders of the two sides since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949." |
| 2016 | Tsai Ing-wen wins a landslide. Beijing suspends official cross-strait communications on 25 June 2016 and calls her answer an "incomplete test paper." |
| 2–4 Aug 2022 | Nancy Pelosi visits Taiwan on 2 August; the People's Liberation Army begins live-fire drills from 4 August in six zones, described as China's biggest escalation in the region since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996. |
What the Pattern Shows
- Contact depended on wording. The 1992 formula and the Ma-era agreements worked while both sides could accept an ambiguous formula. Beijing suspended official contact in 2016 when Tsai's answer did not satisfy it.
- Law and force stand behind the claim. The Anti-Secession Law was passed by the NPC (see the Chapter 2 structure and Chapter 7's amendment vote on how that body works). Its provision for military action is a formal statement, not only rhetoric.
- Escalation is episodic. The 2022 drills followed a visit by a US official; the sources describe them as the largest escalation since 1996.
Hands-On Exercises
A news article says "the US agrees that Taiwan is part of China." Using the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué wording, explain what is wrong and rewrite the sentence.
Trace the sequence from the 1992 Consensus to the 2016 suspension of contact, and say what role the "different interpretations" clause plays in it.
List three claims about Taiwan that this chapter deliberately leaves unverified, and say what source you would look for to check each.
Quick Reference
- 1945: Taiwan retroceded to the ROC; 1949: ROC government retreats to Taiwan
- PRC: one China principle; Taiwan an "inalienable province"
- US: one China policy; 1972 wording "acknowledges" but "does not challenge"
- 1992: SEF–ARATS talks, "1992 Consensus"; 1993 Wang–Koo summit
- March 2005: Anti-Secession Law
- 2008–2016: Ma era, 23 agreements; 7 Nov 2015 Xi–Ma meeting in Singapore
- 25 June 2016: Beijing suspends official communications after Tsai's win
- Aug 2022: live-fire drills after Pelosi's visit
- Unverified here: recognition count, 2024 election result, recent polls