Absolute & Constitutional Monarchies: Saudi Arabia & Jordan
Middle East Politics Fundamentals
Chapter 2 · Absolute & Constitutional Monarchies: Saudi Arabia & Jordan
Both countries call themselves a kingdom. That single shared word is doing almost none of the real work here — Saudi Arabia's own monarchy rests on an uncodified religious-legal basis with no written constitution in the ordinary sense, while Jordan's rests on a real, dated 1952 constitution and a genuine (if genuinely uneven) history of codifying limits on royal power. This chapter takes each in turn, then compares them directly.
Saudi Arabia: An Uncodified, Religious-Legal Basis for Rule
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was formally proclaimed on 23 September 1932, when Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, after roughly three decades of military consolidation across the Arabian Peninsula, unified the Hejaz and Najd under one royal decree. The state that resulted has never operated with a constitution in the sense Jordan's own 1952 document represents.
The closest real equivalent is the Basic Law of Governance, promulgated by Royal Decree A/90 on 1 March 1992 under King Fahd. Rather than establishing itself as the state's own supreme legal authority, the Basic Law explicitly names something else as the constitution:
Succession: From Purely Discretionary to Partially Formalized
The Basic Law restricts the kingship to "the sons of King Abdul Aziz" and their own sons, with "the most suitable among them" to be chosen — a real rule about who is eligible, but historically left the actual choice of successor to the reigning king's own discretion, with no binding institutional check.
That changed, partially, in October 2006, when King Abdullah issued the Allegiance Institution Law, formally constituting the Allegiance Council (Hay'at al-Bay'ah) on 7 December 2007 — a body bringing together representatives of Ibn Saud's own sons to reach a real, collective consensus on succession, rather than leaving the decision to one person's own private judgment.
The Shura Council: Consultative, Not Legislative
Saudi Arabia has no elected national legislature. The Shura Council — the country's consultative assembly — is entirely appointed: the King personally names every member to four-year terms, along with the Council's own Speaker and other officers, by royal decree. It can propose and review legislation but cannot itself pass binding law.
| Institution | Real, verified status |
|---|---|
| Shura Council | Fully appointed by the King; advisory, not legislative |
| Municipal councils | Half the seats elected since 2005 (men only); women first permitted to vote and stand in 2015, winning roughly 1% of all available seats |
| Political parties | Not permitted |
Jordan: A More Codified Constitutional Balance
Transjordan gained full independence from Britain on 17 June 1946 under the Treaty of London, with Abdullah I crowned king that May. The country adopted its own real, still-current constitution in 1952, establishing a bicameral National Assembly:
House of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwwab)
The real, elected lower chamber — members chosen by general, secret, direct election, with elections held at least every four years
Senate (Majlis al-A'yan)
The appointed upper chamber — members named by the King himself to four-year terms; if the House is dissolved, the Senate's own sessions are suspended too
A real, elected chamber is a genuine structural difference from Saudi Arabia's fully appointed Shura Council. But it does not, on its own, make Jordan a parliamentary democracy in the sense the UK or Israel (covered in Chapter 7) would recognize: the King appoints the Prime Minister directly, and may dismiss him, without that choice depending on the House's own confidence in the way a true parliamentary system would require.
A Genuinely Two-Directional Constitutional History
Jordan's own real constitutional record since 2011 doesn't move in one simple direction, and that's worth being explicit about rather than smoothing over:
The Electoral System Itself Has Also Changed Repeatedly
Political Theory Fundamentals' own Chapter 8 covers how electoral system design shapes real outcomes — Jordan's own House of Representatives elections are a concrete, real case of that design changing more than once. A 2012 law introduced a mixed system, with only 27 of 150 seats chosen by proportional representation on a single national list; a further 2016 reform replaced that closed national list with genuine open-list proportional representation across multiple districts, letting voters choose among individual candidates within a list rather than the list alone.
Comparing the Two Directly
| Saudi Arabia | Jordan | |
|---|---|---|
| Founding | 23 September 1932 | 17 June 1946 (independence); 1952 constitution |
| Governing document | 1992 Basic Law of Governance — names the Quran/Sunnah, not itself, as the constitution | A real, standing 1952 constitution, amended repeatedly since |
| National legislature | Shura Council — fully appointed, advisory only | Bicameral National Assembly — elected House, appointed Senate |
| Succession | Restricted to Ibn Saud's own descendants; since 2007, requires an Allegiance Council majority | Hereditary within the Hashemite line, as set out directly in the constitution |
| Recent institutional trend | A real, narrow move toward formalized succession (2006-07); a real, narrow institutional exception splitting King and PM (2022) | Genuinely two-directional — a real Constitutional Court (2012) alongside a real expansion of unchecked royal appointment power (2016) |
What Comes Next
Chapter 3 turns to the Gulf monarchies as a group — the UAE's own federal structure spanning seven emirates, alongside Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, closing with Kuwait's own genuinely more assertive elected National Assembly as a documented regional outlier among them.
Hands-On Exercises
Explain the real, structural difference between a country whose constitution claims supreme legal authority in its own right and Saudi Arabia's own Basic Law, which instead names the Quran and Sunnah as the state's constitution and subordinates itself to them.
Using this chapter's own real 2016 Jordanian amendments, explain why "constitutional" reform cannot be assumed to always mean "more limits on a ruler's own power" — and identify specifically which powers moved in the opposite direction that year.
Compare Saudi Arabia's Allegiance Council (est. 2006-07) and Jordan's elected House of Representatives as two genuinely different real mechanisms for constraining a single individual's own discretion — what, specifically, does each one actually constrain, and what does each leave completely untouched?
Chapter 2 Quick Reference
- Saudi Arabia: proclaimed 23 September 1932; the 1992 Basic Law of Governance names the Quran and Sunnah, not itself, as the state's constitution; a fully appointed Shura Council; succession restricted to Ibn Saud's descendants and, since the 2006-07 Allegiance Council, requiring a real recorded majority
- A real, recent exception: the King and Prime Minister roles were formally separated for the first time on 27 September 2022
- Jordan: independent 17 June 1946; a real, standing 1952 constitution; a bicameral National Assembly (elected House of Representatives, appointed Senate)
- Jordan's constitutional history moves both directions: a real Constitutional Court created in 2012, alongside real, unchecked royal appointment power over the judiciary and security services added in 2016
- Electoral design changes: Jordan's own House elections shifted from a mixed system (2012) to open-list proportional representation (2016) — a real, concrete case study for Political Theory Fundamentals' own Chapter 8