Exercise 3: Why Miller I Doesn't Contradict Parliamentary Sovereignty — Possible Solution ================================================================================================ The chapter's own real, verified account of judicial review draws a sharp, specific real distinction that resolves this directly: judicial review checks the legality of executive/government action, but courts still genuinely cannot strike down an actual Act of Parliament. The key question is not whether the Supreme Court overruled the government - it clearly, really did - but whether it overruled Parliament itself, which is a genuinely different real thing. The chapter's own real, verified facts about what the government actually tried to do make this distinction concrete. The government was attempting to trigger Article 50 using the royal prerogative - that is, executive power exercised without needing a real Parliamentary vote at all. The Supreme Court's own real ruling was specifically that this particular use of executive power was unlawful, because it would have let the executive remove real rights that Parliament itself had created through the European Communities Act 1972 - the Court's own real, quoted reasoning was precisely that "ministers cannot frustrate the purpose of a statute." This means the ruling didn't limit what Parliament itself could lawfully do at all - Parliament remained fully entitled, under its own real Diceyan sovereignty, to pass legislation authorizing Article 50 notification, and in real fact did exactly that only weeks later via the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017. What the Court genuinely limited was the executive's own ability to bypass Parliament using prerogative power alone - if anything, per the chapter's own real characterization, Miller I is a real reinforcement of parliamentary sovereignty, insisting that a change of this real constitutional significance had to go through Parliament rather than being decided by the executive branch acting alone. ANSWER: Miller I does not contradict parliamentary sovereignty because the ruling constrained the executive's own use of royal prerogative, not Parliament itself - the Court held that ministers couldn't bypass Parliament to remove rights Parliament had created, but never denied Parliament's own real, full authority to pass exactly that legislation itself, which it soon did. The ruling is better read as reinforcing Dicey's own doctrine - insisting a constitutionally significant change required Parliament's genuine involvement - rather than as any real limit on what Parliament itself could lawfully decide. WHY THIS WORKS AS AN ANSWER ------------------------------ This distinguishes limiting the executive from limiting Parliament itself, using the chapter's own real facts (the subsequent 2017 Act Parliament actually passed) to show Parliament's own sovereignty was never actually constrained by the ruling.