Exercise 2: What Happens After a Real Vote of No Confidence — Possible Solution
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The chapter's own real, verified fusion-of-powers mechanics explain
this directly. A parliamentary prime minister's own real legitimacy
derives specifically from commanding the confidence of a majority in
the legislature - this is the actual, defining basis of parliamentary
authority the chapter establishes, not a separate, independently-
elected mandate. Once that confidence is genuinely withdrawn through a
real vote of no confidence, the prime minister's own real basis for
holding office no longer exists.

The chapter's own real, verified consequence follows immediately: the
government must genuinely resign, or call new elections to let voters
resolve the situation. This isn't an optional or negotiable outcome -
it follows directly and necessarily from the real, structural fact
that the executive in a parliamentary system was never actually
separate from the legislature in the first place; it exists only for
as long as the legislature continues to support it.

A strict presidential system has no direct real parallel to this
mechanism because, by the chapter's own real definition, the
president's own legitimacy comes from a genuinely separate, direct
election, not from ongoing legislative confidence. A president who
loses substantial support in the legislature can still remain in
office for their full fixed term, since their own real mandate was
never tied to legislative approval on a continuing basis the way a
prime minister's is. The closest real presidential-system mechanism is
impeachment - but the chapter notes this is a genuinely different,
much higher real bar, typically requiring a specific finding of
wrongdoing rather than simply a loss of political support or
confidence, which is all a parliamentary vote of no confidence
actually requires.

ANSWER: After losing a real vote of no confidence, the government must
resign or call new elections, since the prime minister's own real
legitimacy is directly and continuously tied to holding legislative
confidence, per the chapter's own fusion-of-powers mechanics. A
strict presidential system has no direct parallel because a
president's own separate, fixed-term mandate isn't tied to ongoing
legislative approval - the closest equivalent, impeachment, requires a
genuinely higher real bar (specific wrongdoing) than simply losing
political support.

WHY THIS WORKS AS AN ANSWER
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This explains the real mechanism connecting confidence loss to
resignation (the executive's own legitimacy is legislatively
grounded), and correctly distinguishes impeachment's real, higher bar
from a no-confidence vote's lower one, rather than treating the two as
directly equivalent mechanisms.