Exercise 1: Only Two of Seven Transitions Were Elections — Possible Solution
==================================================================================================================

This exercise asks which two of the seven real power transitions in
this chapter happened through an election rather than death,
succession, or a coup, and what it says about the chapter's own theme
that only two of seven did.

IDENTIFYING THE TWO REAL ELECTION-BASED TRANSITIONS
Looking at the seven-row table: Naguib to Nasser was an internal power
removal, not an election. Nasser to Sadat happened because Nasser died
in office. Sadat to Mubarak happened because Sadat was assassinated,
with his own Vice President succeeding him immediately. SCAF's rule
began because Mubarak resigned under mass protest, and ended because
SCAF handed power to an elected civilian government - not because SCAF
itself lost an election. That leaves exactly two real transitions that
were themselves decided by a competitive vote: Morsi's own 2012
election, and Sisi's 2014 election (which followed his own coup, but
was the specific mechanism by which he formally became president
rather than simply the military's own acting head).

WHAT THIS SAYS ABOUT THE CHAPTER'S OWN THEME
The chapter's real argument is that the military has been the actual
decisive power broker across seven decades, regardless of who formally
held office - and the transition pattern itself is direct evidence for
that argument. Five of the seven real transitions were resolved by
death, internal removal, resignation under pressure, or a direct
military takeover - mechanisms that bypass the electorate entirely. Of
the two that did involve a competitive vote, one (Morsi's) was reversed
by the military within a single year through a coup, and the other
(Sisi's) followed directly from that same coup. In other words, even
the two real elections that did occur sit inside a larger pattern the
military ultimately controlled the outcome of - one by overturning an
election it did not like, the other by running as a candidate itself
after having already seized power by force.

ANSWER: Only Morsi's 2012 election and Sisi's 2014 election were
themselves decided by a competitive vote; the other five transitions
(Naguib-to-Nasser, Nasser's death, Sadat's assassination, Mubarak's
forced resignation, and SCAF's direct takeover) bypassed an election
entirely. That only two of seven followed from a vote at all - and
that one of those two was itself overturned by the military within a
year - is direct, real evidence for the chapter's own central claim:
across seven decades, the military has consistently been the actual
decisive actor in Egyptian power transitions, whether or not an
election happened to be involved.

WHY THIS WORKS AS AN ANSWER
------------------------------
It correctly identifies both election-based transitions, and connects
the count (two of seven, one of those two reversed) directly back to
the chapter's own stated thesis rather than treating the identification
task as separate from the analytical question.