Exercise 2: What Accountability Actually Disappeared With the Prime Minister's Office — Possible Solution
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This exercise asks, using the fused-vs-separated executive distinction
from Political Theory Fundamentals Chapter 9, what specifically
changed about the relationship between Turkey's executive and its
legislature once the office of Prime Minister was abolished in 2017 -
not just that the office disappeared, but what kind of accountability
went with it.

THE FUSED-EXECUTIVE MODEL, BEFORE 2017
Under the 1982 constitution's original design, the Prime Minister and
the Council of Ministers were drawn from, and directly answerable to,
the Turkish Grand National Assembly. This is the real, defining feature
of a fused parliamentary executive: the government in office only
continues to govern for as long as it retains the confidence of the
legislature. If the TGNA had genuinely withdrawn its support, the
Prime Minister's government could, in principle, fall - a real,
ongoing form of day-to-day legislative leverage over who actually runs
the country.

THE SEPARATED-EXECUTIVE MODEL, AFTER 2017
Once the Prime Minister's office was abolished, the President became
sole head of both state and government - appointing Vice President(s)
and ministers directly, with no parliamentary confidence vote required
at any point. This is the real, defining feature of a separated
presidential executive: the President is elected independently of the
legislature, serves a fixed five-year term, and cannot be removed from
office simply because the TGNA no longer supports the government's own
policies.

WHAT ACCOUNTABILITY ACTUALLY DISAPPEARED
The accountability that disappeared is specifically the ongoing,
confidence-based check - the real, structural fact that under the old
system, the actual day-to-day government could be brought down between
elections if it lost the legislature's support. Under the post-2017
system, the President's own removal (short of impeachment mechanisms,
which are a separate and much narrower process) depends entirely on
the next scheduled election, not on any ongoing legislative confidence
requirement. The TGNA still passes laws and can refuse to pass a
president's proposed legislation, but it can no longer force a change
of government simply by withdrawing support from it.

ANSWER: What disappeared with the Prime Minister's office was the
ongoing, confidence-based accountability that defines a fused
parliamentary executive - the real possibility that the government in
power could fall between scheduled elections if the legislature
withdrew its support. What replaced it is the separated-executive
model's own form of accountability instead: a President who is
independently elected, serves a fixed term regardless of the
legislature's day-to-day confidence, and answers to voters only at the
next scheduled election rather than to parliament on an ongoing basis.

WHY THIS WORKS AS AN ANSWER
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It goes beyond noting that an office was abolished and instead names
the specific structural mechanism (confidence-based removability
between elections) that the office's existence had provided, and
explains precisely what replaced that mechanism rather than simply
restating that the system "became presidential."