Exercise 3: Why Informing Kohl Before Moscow Is Real Evidence About Soviet Authority in 1989 — Possible Solution ================================================================================================================== This exercise is asking you to explain what this specific sequence of communications actually reveals about the real, practical state of Soviet control over its own satellite states, not just describe what happened. WHAT THE EXPECTED SEQUENCE WOULD HAVE LOOKED LIKE UNDER GENUINE SOVIET CONTROL Under a genuinely intact system of Soviet authority over the Warsaw Pact, a member government planning a major foreign-policy decision affecting another member state (East Germany) would be expected to seek Moscow's own prior approval before acting, and certainly before informing a NATO head of government of its intentions. Soviet permission would function as a genuine precondition for action, not an afterthought. WHAT NÉMETH ACTUALLY DID INSTEAD Németh personally informed West German Chancellor Kohl of Hungary's real intentions directly, telling him that Hungary would handle its own border situation and that Gorbachev's own permission was unnecessary. Moscow was only informed afterward, when Kohl himself contacted Gorbachev - meaning Hungary treated a NATO leader's awareness of its plans as more immediately important than securing prior Soviet approval. WHY THIS SEQUENCE IS GENUINE EVIDENCE OF ERODED SOVIET AUTHORITY, NOT JUST A PROCEDURAL DETAIL If Soviet approval still functioned as a real, necessary precondition for major satellite-state decisions, Németh's own approach - proceeding without it and treating it as unnecessary - would have been a genuinely reckless gamble. That Hungary felt confident enough to act this way, and that Gorbachev's own real, documented response afterward was simply approving ("a good man") rather than any form of reprimand or reversal, shows that Soviet authority had already weakened enough in practice that a satellite government could act first and inform Moscow after, without serious consequence. WHY GORBACHEV'S OWN REAL RESPONSE CONFIRMS THIS RATHER THAN COMPLICATING IT If Gorbachev's genuine reaction to being bypassed had been anger, reversal of the decision, or punitive consequences for Hungary, that would suggest Soviet authority remained real and enforceable even when circumvented. Instead, his real, documented response was approval - confirming after the fact that Hungary had correctly judged Moscow's own actual capacity and willingness to object, further reinforcing that Soviet control over this kind of decision had genuinely eroded by 1989, not merely that Hungary got lucky this one time. ANSWER: Németh informing Kohl before Moscow is significant evidence that real Soviet authority over its own satellite states had already eroded by 1989, because a genuinely intact system of Soviet control would have required prior Moscow approval as a real precondition for a decision this significant, rather than treating that approval as unnecessary and informing a NATO chancellor first. Gorbachev's own real, documented response after being informed - approving rather than reprimanding or reversing the decision - confirms this reading rather than complicating it: Hungary correctly judged that Moscow's own actual capacity and willingness to object had genuinely weakened, and acted accordingly with real confidence rather than taking a reckless, uncalculated gamble. WHY THIS WORKS AS AN ANSWER ------------------------------ It contrasts the expected sequence under genuine Soviet authority against what Németh actually did, then uses Gorbachev's own real approving response as confirming evidence rather than an unrelated detail, to establish that Soviet control had genuinely eroded rather than merely being circumvented by chance.