Exercise 2: Why Horn's Legal Argument Mattered Practically, Not Just as Diplomatic Formality — Possible Solution ================================================================================================================== This exercise is asking you to identify the concrete, practical function Horn's legal argument actually served, beyond simply being a polite way of phrasing a decision Hungary had already made. WHAT A "MERE FORMALITY" READING WOULD ASSUME If Horn's legal justification were only a diplomatic formality, it would have functioned purely as polite packaging around a decision Hungary intended to make regardless - a way of softening East Germany's real objections without the argument itself actually being load-bearing for Hungary's own justification or defense of its own actions. WHY THE ARGUMENT WAS ACTUALLY SUBSTANTIVE, NOT MERELY POLITE PACKAGING Hungary's real 1969 bilateral agreement with East Germany had genuinely restricted freedom of movement, meaning Hungary had a real, existing legal obligation that its own actions were now directly contradicting. Horn's argument - that international refugee treaties took precedence over that specific bilateral agreement - was not simply diplomatic courtesy; it was the actual legal basis Hungary needed to claim it was not straightforwardly violating its own prior treaty commitments, but rather resolving a genuine conflict between two different real legal obligations in favor of the one with real precedence. WHY THIS DISTINCTION MATTERS FOR HUNGARY'S OWN REAL POSITION Without a real, substantive legal argument to stand on, Hungary's action would have been a straightforward breach of its own bilateral commitment to East Germany, with no independent legal grounding to appeal to. With Horn's argument in place, Hungary could instead present its own action as the correct resolution of a genuine conflict between obligations - a materially stronger, more defensible position both diplomatically and legally, not merely a softer way of describing the same breach. WHY THE FINANCIAL DETAIL REINFORCES THIS, RATHER THAN REPLACING IT The chapter's own additional real detail - that maintaining the old automated border system required Western hard currency Hungary didn't have - supports the same point from a different angle: it shows Hungary's own decision rested on multiple genuine, independent grounds (a legal argument and a real practical/financial constraint), not merely a convenient diplomatic phrase invented to make an otherwise unjustified decision sound acceptable. ANSWER: Horn's legal argument mattered practically, not merely as diplomatic formality, because it gave Hungary an actual legal basis for resolving a genuine conflict between two real obligations - its own 1969 bilateral agreement with East Germany restricting movement, and international refugee treaties that, per Horn's real argument, took precedence over it. Without this substantive legal grounding, Hungary's action would have been a straightforward breach of its own prior treaty commitment with no independent justification; with it, Hungary could present its decision as the correct legal resolution of a genuine conflict between obligations, a materially stronger real position - further reinforced, not replaced, by the real financial fact that Hungary could no longer afford the hard-currency costs of maintaining the old border system. WHY THIS WORKS AS AN ANSWER ------------------------------ It explains the specific practical function the legal argument served ( resolving a genuine conflict between two real obligations) rather than treating it as interchangeable with a polite diplomatic phrase, and shows why the added financial detail reinforces rather than substitutes for that legal substance.