Exercise 2: Why the Leipzig Demonstrations Being Allowed to Grow Reveals Something About the Soviet Union — Possible Solution ================================================================================================================== This exercise is asking you to identify what actually changed between 1953 and 1989 - and to recognize that the change was not primarily about East Germany's own regime. WHAT STAYED THE SAME BETWEEN 1953 AND 1989 Both events involved large-scale, real popular unrest directly challenging the SED's own authority. Chapter 4's 1953 uprising reached roughly 339,000 participants nationwide; the Leipzig Monday demonstrations reached comparable real scale, growing from 70,000 by October 1989 to an estimated 500,000 by November. In both cases, the East German government itself faced genuine, large-scale popular pressure it could not simply ignore. WHAT ACTUALLY DIFFERED IN HOW EACH WAS HANDLED In 1953, the uprising was crushed within a single day, once Soviet tanks and troops entered East Berlin directly and used force. In 1989, by contrast, the Leipzig demonstrations were allowed to continue growing, completely unchallenged, for over two months - and when Gorbachev himself visited East Berlin in October 1989, he gave real, explicit orders keeping Soviet troops confined to their barracks rather than deploying them. WHY THIS DIFFERENCE POINTS TO MOSCOW, NOT TO EAST BERLIN East Germany's own security apparatus - most obviously the Stasi, covered in Chapter 4 - had not become weaker or less willing to use force between 1953 and 1989. What had genuinely changed was whether the Soviet Union itself was still willing to authorize and back that force with its own military power. The 1953 uprising was suppressed specifically because Soviet tanks did the suppressing; the 1989 demonstrations grew unchecked specifically because Gorbachev deliberately withheld that same backing. WHY THIS MATTERS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE SED'S OWN REAL POSITION This shows that the SED's own decades-long ability to survive genuine, large-scale popular unrest was never really a reflection of its own independent strength or legitimacy - it depended the whole time on Soviet military backing being available when needed. Once that backing was withdrawn in 1989, the SED's own real underlying weakness, visible as far back as 1953 and the emigration crisis that built the Wall, had nothing left protecting it. ANSWER: The Leipzig demonstrations being allowed to grow for over two months, unlike the 1953 uprising, reveals that the crucial difference between the two events was the Soviet Union's own willingness to back forceful suppression with real military power - not any change in East Germany's own regime or its own security apparatus, which remained just as willing to use force in 1989 as in 1953. Gorbachev's explicit decision to keep Soviet troops in their barracks during his October 1989 visit shows this directly: the SED's own decades-long survival had always depended on Moscow's backing, and once that backing was withdrawn, the regime's own real underlying weakness had nothing left standing between it and the crowds. WHY THIS WORKS AS AN ANSWER ------------------------------ It isolates the one variable that actually changed between the two events (Soviet willingness to authorize force) from the variables that stayed constant (the scale of unrest, the SED's own continued willingness to suppress it), showing the real explanation lies with Moscow rather than with East Berlin.