Reunification

German Political History II: Division, Reunification & the Federal Republic

Chapter 7 · Reunification: The Real Legal & Political Mechanics (1990)

Chapter 6 closed with the Wall opened by genuine accident — no government had planned that specific night. What followed it was the opposite: a deliberate, negotiated, and remarkably fast legal process, turning two separate states back into one within eleven months.

March 1990: A Mandate for Speed

East Germany's first genuinely free elections, held for the Volkskammer, delivered a clear verdict: the former ruling communist party was heavily defeated, and a CDU-led coalition formed under Lothar de Maizière on an explicit platform of rapid reunification. The result gave East Germany's own new government a real, direct mandate to move quickly rather than negotiate a slower, more open-ended process.

Article 23 vs. Article 146: Two Paths, One Chosen for Speed

The Basic Law itself had always contained two real, different routes to reunification. Article 146 pointed toward drafting an entirely new, jointly negotiated constitution for a reunified Germany — the genuinely deliberate route, matching Chapter 2's own real finding that the Basic Law had been named provisionally, with reunification already in mind from 1949. Article 23, by contrast, allowed any new territory to simply accede to the existing Federal Republic and adopt its existing Basic Law directly.

Article 146 (new constitution)Article 23 (accession) — the path actually taken
ProcessA new, jointly negotiated constitution written from scratch by both German statesEast Germany's states simply join the existing Federal Republic and adopt its existing Basic Law
Real timelineOpen-ended, likely years of negotiationAs little as six months
Real institutional riskRenegotiating institutions that were already working (Chapters 2–3's own real design fixes)None — West Germany's existing constitutional structure simply extends eastward unchanged
Finding: the "provisional" article was never actually used Chapter 2's own real account of the Basic Law's naming choice — "Basic Law," not "Constitution" — showed its drafters deliberately signaled the document's own provisional status pending reunification, and Article 146 was written specifically to be the mechanism for that eventual moment. When reunification actually arrived in 1990, Germany's own leaders chose speed over that original symbolic intention: by early 1990 East Germany was in genuine economic and political collapse, and Article 23's accession route could be completed in a fraction of the time.

Monetary Union and a Costly Act of Political Generosity

The Treaty on the Creation of a Monetary, Economic and Social Union took effect 1 July 1990, replacing the East German mark with the West German Deutsche Mark. The real exchange rate the East German mark had actually traded at on the black market before this — roughly 5 to 10 East marks per West German mark — was nowhere close to the rate ultimately chosen for ordinary citizens' wages and savings: 1:1, up to a real cap of 4,000 marks per adult (2,000 for children, 6,000 for those over 60); larger savings and debts converted at 2:1, and money judged "speculative" — acquired shortly before unification — converted at a real, harsher 3:1.

A real, deliberate subsidy — with a real economic cost Converting ordinary East German wages and modest savings at 1:1, several times above the currency's own real market value, functioned as a genuine, large-scale political subsidy to East German citizens. It also meant East German industry suddenly had to pay wages and costs in a currency worth several times what its own goods could actually earn on export markets — a real structural shock the chapters ahead directly trace to what happened next.

The Treuhandanstalt: The Real Price of Reunification

The Treuhandanstalt, East Germany's own privatization agency, inherited roughly 8,500 state-owned enterprises employing over four million people — real assets ranging from steel works and the Babelsberg film studios to 2.4 million hectares of former agricultural and forest land. Of those four million employees, an estimated 2.5 million were laid off in the early 1990s as the agency worked through privatizing, restructuring, or closing enterprises that could no longer compete once the currency shock made their own costs uncompetitive. By the time it wound down in 1994, the Treuhandanstalt had accumulated roughly DM 260–270 billion in debt rather than the profit its own privatization mandate had originally been expected to generate.

Finding: the assassination of the agency's own first chairman On 1 April 1991, Treuhandanstalt chairman Detlev Karsten Rohwedder was shot dead at his own home, in an unsolved killing widely attributed to the Red Army Faction — a real, violent measure of how contested and politically charged the agency's own economic restructuring work had become within less than a year of reunification itself.

Two Plus Four: Clearing the Real International Obstacle

Domestic reunification still needed the consent of the same four Allied powers that had occupied Germany since 1945. The "Two Plus Four" talks — both German states plus the US, UK, France, and the Soviet Union — produced a real treaty signed 12 September 1990, resolving the international side of reunification directly: full German sovereignty was granted on 15 March 1991, and Soviet troops stationed on former East German territory were not fully withdrawn until 31 August 1994.

The Unification Treaty and 3 October 1990

The Unification Treaty (Einigungsvertrag) itself was signed 31 August 1990, approved by large majorities in both the Volkskammer and the Bundestag on 20 September, and took effect 29 September. At midnight on 3 October 1990, East Germany's five reconstituted states plus East Berlin formally acceded to the Federal Republic under Article 23 — just under eleven months after the Wall's own accidental opening.

Finding: an accidental beginning, a deliberate end — and a real, lasting cost in between Chapter 6 showed the Wall's own fall was genuinely unplanned. What followed it was the exact opposite: a fast, legally deliberate process completed inside a single year. But the same speed that made reunification possible — most directly, the politically generous but economically overvalued 1:1 currency conversion — is what produced the Treuhandanstalt's own real, documented cost of 2.5 million lost jobs, a burden this course's later chapters on Germany's modern party system will need to reckon with directly.

Hands-On Exercises

Exercise 1

Explain why choosing Article 23 over Article 146 represented choosing speed over the Basic Law's own original symbolic purpose, as established in Chapter 2.

Exercise 2

Explain the real, causal connection between the 1:1 currency conversion rate and the Treuhandanstalt's own documented 2.5 million job losses.

Exercise 3

Explain why reunification needed the Two Plus Four Treaty in addition to the purely domestic Unification Treaty — what real problem did the international agreement solve that the domestic one could not?

Quick Reference

  • March 1990: East Germany's first free Volkskammer election delivers a mandate for speedy reunification
  • Article 23 (accession), not Article 146 (new constitution): chosen for speed — as little as six months
  • 1 July 1990: monetary union — the Deutsche Mark replaces the East German mark, mostly at a generous, economically overvalued 1:1 rate
  • The Treuhandanstalt: privatized 8,500 state enterprises; ~2.5 million of 4 million employees laid off; DM 260–270bn in debt by 1994
  • 12 September 1990: the Two Plus Four Treaty signed; full sovereignty granted 15 March 1991; Soviet troops fully withdrawn 31 August 1994
  • 3 October 1990: formal reunification — five East German states plus East Berlin accede to the Federal Republic