The European Parliament

European Politics Fundamentals

Chapter 3 · The European Parliament: Directly Elected, Genuinely Limited

Chapter 2 established the Commission's near-total monopoly on proposing legislation. This chapter takes the other side of that relationship: the EU's only directly elected body, which lacks the power to start the legislative process itself, yet holds one real power dramatic enough to have already brought down an entire Commission — without ever successfully casting the vote that power is actually named after.

Direct Elections Since 1979

June 1979

Before 1979, Members of the European Parliament were appointed by national parliaments, not elected directly by citizens. The June 1979 European Parliament election changed that — the first direct election of its kind held internationally anywhere, returning 410 MEPs across the then-nine member states. The directly-elected Parliament has grown substantially since: for the 2024–2029 term, it holds 720 seats, an increase of 15 from the previous term's 705.

Degressive Proportionality: A Deliberate Departure From "One Person, One Vote"

Seats aren't allocated in strict proportion to population. Under the real principle of degressive proportionality, formalized through European Council decisions such as Decision (EU) 2023/2061, larger member states receive more seats overall, but proportionally fewer seats per capita than smaller member states do. A citizen of a small member state's own vote, in practical terms, carries more electoral weight in seat-allocation terms than a citizen of a large member state's vote.

Why this isn't simply a flaw Degressive proportionality is a deliberate design choice, not an oversight — it protects smaller member states from being permanently drowned out by population-weighted representation alone, the same underlying concern the US Senate's own equal-representation-per-state structure addresses through a different mechanism entirely.

The Real, Structural Limitation

No formal right of legislative initiative Per Article 17(2) TEU (covered in Chapter 2), Parliament cannot formally introduce EU legislation itself. It may request that the Commission submit a proposal on a given subject — but the Commission isn't legally obligated to act on that request. This is a real, genuine limitation with no equivalent in most national lower houses, where any individual member can typically table a bill.

What Parliament Actually Can Do

Amend & Reject Legislation

Under the ordinary legislative procedure, Parliament sits on equal footing with the Council of the EU for most policy areas — it can amend or reject a Commission proposal outright, even though it can't originate one.

Budgetary Power

Parliament shares real authority over the EU's own annual budget alongside the Council.

Approving the Commission

Parliament must approve both the Commission President (covered in Chapter 2) and the College of Commissioners as a whole before either can take office.

The Motion of Censure

Under Article 234 TFEU, Parliament can force the entire Commission to resign as a body — its most dramatic real power, and the subject of this chapter's own central case.

The Real, Precise Story of the Santer Commission

Article 234 TFEU sets a genuinely high bar: a motion of censure requires a two-thirds majority of votes cast and a majority of Parliament's own total component members. The real history of this power is more interesting than "Parliament successfully used it" — because, to date, it never actually has.

14 January 1999: The Formal Vote Failed A motion of censure against Jacques Santer's Commission, requested by the Socialist Group, was put to a vote and rejected — 293 against, 232 in favor, 27 abstentions. The threshold wasn't met. On paper, Parliament's own censure power had just failed.

15 March 1999: The Commission Resigned Anyway Having rejected the censure motion, Parliament instead demanded an independent Committee of Experts investigate the Commission's own conduct. That committee's report, delivered 15 March 1999, documented real fraud and mismanagement. Facing the near-certainty of a second, this time successful, censure vote — and with the Commission President lacking any formal power to dismiss individual implicated Commissioners himself — the entire 20-member Santer Commission resigned as a body that same evening, months before its own term was due to end.

The genuinely interesting finding Article 234's own formal power has never once been successfully exercised by a vote. Yet its credible threat, combined with an independent investigation, has already brought down an entire European Commission — a real demonstration that a legislature's own power can operate through deterrence just as effectively as through its literal, formal use.

"Genuinely Limited" Doesn't Mean Powerless

Power	Does Parliament Have It?
Propose new EU legislation	No — this sits with the Commission alone (Article 17(2) TEU)
Amend or block proposed legislation	Yes — equal footing with the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure
Approve the Commission before it takes office	Yes — both the President individually and the College as a whole
Force the entire Commission to resign mid-term	Yes, in principle (Article 234 TFEU) — though never yet exercised by a successful formal vote

Hands-On Exercises

Exercise 1 — Degressive Proportionality

Explain, in your own words, why a system that gives smaller member states proportionally more seats per capita than larger ones is a deliberate design choice rather than a flaw — and name one comparable real-world mechanism from another political system that addresses a similar underlying concern.

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Exercise 2 — Initiative vs. Amendment

Explain the real, precise difference between "the power to propose legislation" and "the power to amend or reject legislation." Why does Parliament having only the second power still matter meaningfully, even without the first?

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Exercise 3 — Threat vs. Formal Use

Using the real 1999 Santer Commission case, explain how a formal power can shape real outcomes even when it's never actually, successfully exercised by a vote. What was the real mechanism connecting the failed 14 January vote to the 15 March resignation?

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Quick Reference — Chapter 3

The European Parliament has been directly elected since June 1979 (410 MEPs, nine member states) and now holds 720 seats for the 2024–2029 term
Degressive proportionality gives smaller member states proportionally more seats per capita than larger ones — a deliberate design choice, formalized in decisions like (EU) 2023/2061
Parliament has no formal right to propose EU legislation (Article 17(2) TEU) — but holds real, equal power to amend or reject it under the ordinary legislative procedure
Article 234 TFEU's motion of censure requires a two-thirds majority of votes cast plus a majority of all members — a threshold never yet successfully met by an actual vote
The entire Jacques Santer Commission (20 members) resigned on 15 March 1999 following an independent experts' report on fraud — not because a censure vote succeeded (one had failed on 14 January), but because a second, likely-successful vote was considered inevitable

What's Next

Chapter 4: The Council of the EU & the European Council: Two Real, Easily Confused Bodies.