Exercise 1: Priya's Separate Admin Account and Database Security 3's Least-Privilege Principle — Possible Solution ==================================================================== WHAT PRIYA ACTUALLY DID IN STEP 3 ------------------------------ Per this capstone, "Priya creates a second, separate local administrator account and switches her daily-use Microsoft account to standard" - her everyday, signed-in account no longer carries administrator rights at all; a distinct account exists solely for the occasions that genuinely require elevation. WHY THIS IS THE SAME PATTERN AS DATABASE SECURITY 3's PRINCIPLE ------------------------------ Per Chapter 4, running day to day as a standard user "mirrors the same principle Database Security 3 teaches for database accounts" - granting an account only the access level it actually needs for its regular job, not the maximum it could theoretically be granted "just in case." Priya's daily-use account only needs to browse, write code, and run development tools - none of which require administrator rights - so it's provisioned at exactly that level, with the higher-privilege account reserved separately. WHY THIS ISN'T AN UNRELATED EXTRA PRECAUTION ------------------------------ This isn't Priya adding a generic "extra security step" the way one might add a stronger password - it's a direct, structural application of the least-privilege principle itself, sized to her actual accounts rather than a database's. If her daily account (or anything running under it) were ever compromised, the damage would be capped at what a standard user can do, exactly the same "blast radius" limitation Chapter 4 described for a database service account with narrowly scoped permissions. WHY THE SEPARATE ACCOUNT SPECIFICALLY MATTERS HERE ------------------------------ Had Priya kept her daily-use account as an administrator "for convenience," any compromise of that account - malware, a malicious downloaded file, anything - would run with full administrator rights automatically, since Chapter 4 established that UAC itself still needs deliberate elevation prompts to be a meaningful barrier at all. Splitting the accounts is what makes standard-user-by-default actually mean something in daily use, rather than being undermined by convenience. WHY THIS WORKS AS AN ANSWER ------------------------------ It describes exactly what Priya's account setup does, connects it directly to Chapter 4's own explicit comparison with Database Security 3's least-privilege principle, and explains why this is a genuine, structural application of that principle to her specific accounts rather than an unrelated, generic security add-on.