Verdun (1916): Real Attrition as a Deliberate Strategy

Military History: World War I

Chapter 5 · Verdun (1916): Real Attrition as a Deliberate Strategy

Chapter 4 showed why breaking through a trench line was almost impossible. In 1916 the German commander, Erich von Falkenhayn, is said to have drawn a radical conclusion: don't try to break through at all. Instead, attack somewhere the enemy can't afford to lose, and kill so many of his soldiers defending it that his army collapses. The result was the longest single battle of the war.

Why Verdun?

A Symbol

Verdun was an ancient fortress city on the River Meuse, with a ring of modern forts. For France, it had deep historical and national meaning.

A Salient

The front bulged around Verdun, so German artillery could fire on it from three sides, while its supply routes to the rest of France were limited.

Weakened Forts

After seeing Belgian forts crushed in 1914 (Chapter 2), the French had stripped many of Verdun's forts of their guns and garrisons to use elsewhere.

"Bleeding France White" — Plan or Excuse?

The Christmas Memorandum

In his memoirs, published in 1919–1920, Falkenhayn said he had written to the Kaiser at Christmas 1915 proposing to attack a point France would defend "to the last man," so that "the forces of France will bleed to death" whether or not Germany captured the place.

The Memorandum Has Never Been Found No copy of this memorandum has ever been found in the German archives. Some historians think Falkenhayn invented or rewrote it after the war to present a failed attempt to capture Verdun as a deliberate strategy of attrition. Others argue it genuinely reflects his thinking, supported by other evidence of his ideas at the time. The debate is still open. What's certain is that German commanders on the ground, like the Crown Prince whose army attacked, clearly believed they were trying to take Verdun.

The Battle: 21 February – 18 December 1916

  • 21 February After a bombardment of around a million shells on a narrow front, German troops attack. French defences are shattered.
  • 25 February Fort Douaumont, the strongest of the forts, falls almost without a fight — it was held by only a small maintenance crew. It's a huge blow to French morale.
  • 25–26 February General Philippe Pétain is put in command at Verdun. He organises artillery and supply and rotates troops through the battle.
  • March–May Germany extends the attack to the west bank of the Meuse, around the hills known as Le Mort Homme ("Dead Man") and Hill 304. Both change hands repeatedly.
  • 7 June Fort Vaux surrenders after days of underground fighting in its corridors, when the defenders run out of water.
  • June–July The German advance reaches its high point near Fleury, which changes hands sixteen times, but can't reach Verdun itself. The Allied offensive on the Somme (Chapter 6) begins on 1 July, drawing German resources away.
  • October–December French counter-attacks under Robert Nivelle and Charles Mangin, using carefully planned artillery barrages, retake Fort Douaumont (24 October) and Fort Vaux.

How France Held On

The Sacred Way

Verdun's only good supply route was a single road from Bar-le-Duc. Thousands of trucks ran along it day and night carrying men, ammunition, and food, while labourers kept throwing stone onto the surface to keep it usable. It became known as the Voie Sacrée, the Sacred Way.

The "Noria"

Pétain rotated divisions in and out of the battle quickly, like buckets on a water wheel (a noria). It spread the strain — but it also meant that a large majority of the whole French army passed through Verdun at some point.

"They Shall Not Pass"

The slogan "Ils ne passeront pas" is linked with Verdun, and especially with Nivelle's orders of the day. It later appeared on French propaganda posters and in other wars.

The Cost

FrenchGerman
Estimated casualties (killed, wounded, missing, captured)About 377,000About 337,000
CombinedAbout 700,000 over ten months — an average of around 70,000 a month
Attrition Cut Both Ways If the aim was to bleed France white, it failed: the German army lost almost as many men as the French. Attrition only works if the enemy loses far more, or can replace losses far less easily. At Verdun, Falkenhayn's own army was drawn into the same slaughter he had meant to inflict. He was replaced in August 1916 by Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, the commanders from the Eastern Front (Chapter 8).
The Landscape Itself Hundreds of thousands of shells turned the ground into a moonscape of overlapping craters. Several villages were destroyed so completely they were never rebuilt; they still officially exist today as "villages that died for France." The Douaumont Ossuary holds the bones of about 130,000 unidentified soldiers from both sides.

Why Verdun Mattered

For France

Verdun became the central French memory of the war — a battle France fought largely alone and survived. Its heavy losses also help explain French exhaustion and the army mutinies of 1917.

For the Somme

Pressure from Verdun forced the British to take on a larger role in the planned joint offensive on the Somme, and to start it sooner — the subject of Chapter 6.

For Pétain and Nivelle

Nivelle's apparent success made him French commander-in-chief, and his disastrous offensive in 1917 followed. Pétain became a national hero — a reputation later destroyed when he led the Vichy government that collaborated with Nazi Germany in the Second World War.

Questions to Sit With

Does it matter whether Falkenhayn really planned an attrition battle, or whether he claimed it afterward? What would each version say about him?
Why does attrition only work as a strategy if the losses are uneven? Why weren't they uneven at Verdun?
How can one person, like Pétain, be seen as a national hero in one war and a traitor in the next?

Quick Reference — Chapter 5

  • Verdun: a symbolic fortress city in a salient, with forts partly stripped of guns; battle lasted 21 February – 18 December 1916
  • Falkenhayn later claimed his aim was to "bleed France white"; his Christmas 1915 memorandum has never been found, and historians debate whether it existed
  • Fort Douaumont fell on 25 February; Pétain took command; Fort Vaux fell on 7 June; Fleury changed hands sixteen times
  • The Voie Sacrée kept Verdun supplied by truck; Pétain's "noria" rotated most of the French army through the battle
  • Nivelle and Mangin's counter-attacks retook Douaumont (24 October) and Vaux by December
  • About 377,000 French and 337,000 German casualties; Falkenhayn was replaced by Hindenburg and Ludendorff in August 1916

What's Next

Chapter 6: The Somme (1916): The Real First Day & the Debut of the Tank.