The July Crisis & the Real Schlieffen Plan

Military History: World War I

Chapter 2 · The July Crisis & the Real Schlieffen Plan

In late June 1914 an assassination in the Balkans set off a diplomatic crisis. Five weeks later, five great powers were at war. This chapter looks at how that happened from a military angle: how war plans and mobilisation timetables narrowed the room for diplomacy, and what Germany's famous plan for a quick victory really was.

Five Weeks: The July Crisis

  • 28 June 1914 Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife Sophie are shot dead in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip, a young Bosnian Serb nationalist linked to a secret Serbian society, the Black Hand.
  • 5–6 July Germany promises Austria-Hungary full support against Serbia, even at the risk of a wider war — the so-called "blank cheque."
  • 23 July Austria-Hungary sends Serbia an ultimatum with a 48-hour deadline, written to be hard to accept.
  • 25 July Serbia accepts most of the demands but refuses to let Austro-Hungarian officials run investigations on Serbian soil.
  • 28 July Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia.
  • 30 July Russia, Serbia's protector, orders general mobilisation.
  • 1–3 August Germany declares war on Russia (1 August) and France (3 August), and demands free passage through neutral Belgium.
  • 4 August German troops enter Belgium. Britain, a guarantor of Belgian neutrality since the 1839 Treaty of London, declares war on Germany.
"A Scrap of Paper"

According to the British ambassador in Berlin, the German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, complained that Britain was going to war over "a scrap of paper" — the 1839 treaty. British propaganda used the phrase heavily as proof of German contempt for international law.

Mobilisation: When Plans Took Over

In 1914, going to war meant calling up millions of reservists and moving them by railway to the frontiers, following timetables worked out years in advance. Whichever country mobilised faster had a real advantage, so each government came under pressure not to fall behind.

Russia's Problem

Russia's plans assumed mobilising against both Austria-Hungary and Germany together. Partial mobilisation against Austria alone was hard to organise, so the Tsar agreed to full mobilisation.

Germany's Problem

Germany's only war plan assumed a war on two fronts, and began with an attack on France through Belgium. Russian mobilisation meant, in German military logic, attacking France first — even though France hadn't been at the centre of the crisis.

"War by Timetable"

The historian A.J.P. Taylor argued that railway timetables made the war almost automatic once mobilisation began. Most historians now think that's too simple: decisions by political leaders still mattered at every step.

Who Was to Blame? A Real Debate The 1919 peace treaty placed responsibility on Germany and its allies. In 1961 the German historian Fritz Fischer argued Germany had deliberately pursued a war of expansion, causing a storm in West Germany. More recently, Christopher Clark's The Sleepwalkers (2012) argued that responsibility was shared across several governments who stumbled into a war none fully intended. Historians still disagree. The political side belongs mainly to World History III; this course focuses on how military planning shaped the choices.

The "Schlieffen Plan"

Count Alfred von Schlieffen was chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1906. His famous memorandum of 1905 set out how Germany might defeat France quickly in a war where Russia was, at that moment, weak after losing to Japan.

The Idea

Avoid France's heavily fortified eastern border. Swing a very strong right wing through Belgium (and, in Schlieffen's version, the southern Netherlands), sweep west of Paris, and trap the French army.

The Timing

Defeat France within about six weeks, before Russia's larger but slower army was ready, then move troops east by rail to face Russia.

The Cost

Attacking through neutral Belgium was almost certain to bring Britain into the war. German planners accepted that risk.

Moltke's Changes

Schlieffen's successor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (nephew of the Moltke mentioned in Military History: The US Civil War, Chapter 10), changed the plan. He dropped the march through the Netherlands, to keep it neutral as a trade route, and strengthened the left wing facing France's border. After the war, German officers blamed these changes for the failure — arguing Moltke had "watered down" a war-winning plan.

Was There Really a "Schlieffen Plan"? In 1999 the historian Terence Zuber argued that the famous plan was largely a myth built up after the war, and that the 1905 memorandum was a thought experiment rather than an operational plan. Other historians disagree strongly, and later archival finds have fed the argument. What's clear is that the idea of a perfect plan ruined by Moltke suited German generals who wanted to explain their defeat. The famous deathbed words "keep the right wing strong," often attributed to Schlieffen, are also doubtful. Even supporters of the plan's existence agree it had real problems: the roads and railways of Belgium and northern France couldn't easily supply the huge armies it required.

August 1914: Plans Meet Reality

Liège

The Belgian fortress city held out for about twelve days until German super-heavy siege howitzers smashed its forts. The delay was short but real.

Plan XVII

France's own plan sent its armies straight into Alsace and Lorraine. In the Battle of the Frontiers, French infantry attacking in the open suffered enormous losses; on 22 August 1914 alone, the French army lost an estimated 27,000 men killed — one of the deadliest single days of the war.

Mons

The small British Expeditionary Force (Military History: The British Empire, Chapter 7) first fought at Mons in Belgium on 23 August, then joined the long Allied retreat southward.

The Invasion of Belgium German troops, fearing attacks by civilian snipers, carried out mass reprisals in Belgium. Several thousand civilians were killed, and in Leuven the university library, with its medieval manuscripts, was burned. Allied propaganda exaggerated some details as "the Rape of Belgium," which led people later to dismiss the whole story. Modern research confirms that the killings and destruction were real.
Back to the Big Question By the end of August German armies were deep in France and heading toward Paris, exactly as planned. Both sides had suffered huge losses, and the German right wing was exhausted and short of supplies. Whether the plan would actually work was decided in early September, on the River Marne — the subject of Chapter 3.

Questions to Sit With

How far do you think military plans and timetables, rather than political decisions, drove the countries of Europe into war?
Why might German generals after the war have preferred the story of a "perfect plan" spoiled by Moltke?
Germany accepted war with Britain as the price of going through Belgium. Was that a military calculation, a political one, or both?

Quick Reference — Chapter 2

  • 28 June 1914: Franz Ferdinand assassinated by Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo
  • Germany's "blank cheque" (5–6 July); Austria's ultimatum (23 July); declaration of war on Serbia (28 July); Russian mobilisation (30 July)
  • Germany declared war on Russia (1 August) and France (3 August); invading Belgium brought Britain in on 4 August ("a scrap of paper")
  • Mobilisation timetables created pressure to act first; "war by timetable" is now seen as too simple; blame is still debated (Fischer, Clark)
  • The 1905 Schlieffen memorandum proposed a quick defeat of France via Belgium; Moltke modified it; whether it was a real plan is disputed (Zuber, 1999)
  • August 1914: Liège delayed the Germans; Plan XVII's French offensives were bloodily repulsed (about 27,000 French killed on 22 August); the BEF fought at Mons; German reprisals killed thousands of Belgian civilians

What's Next

Chapter 3: The Marne (1914) & the Real Failure of a Quick War.