Exercise 1: Which Course 1 Capstone Limitation Each Addition Resolves — Possible Solution ==================================================================== k8s1-12's own closing section named its simplifications honestly. Three of those are resolved directly by this chapter: (a) THE STATEFULSET resolves the database's simplified Deployment+PVC setup. Per k8s1-12's own warn-box, a plain Deployment managing a database pod gives no stable identity and no guaranteed one-to-one relationship between a pod and its storage across restarts/scaling -- a new pod could, in principle, attach to the wrong volume. The StatefulSet from k8s2-1 fixes this with volumeClaimTemplates (one dedicated PVC per pod, tied to that pod's stable ordinal identity) and a headless Service, giving the database exactly the guarantees a Deployment never could. (b) THE NETWORKPOLICY resolves a gap that was never even flagged as a known limitation in k8s1-12 -- the database was reachable from any pod in the cluster with network access to its Service, not just the backend. Chapter 5's NetworkPolicy, applied here, restricts ingress to the database to only pods matching the backend's label selector, closing a real security exposure that existed silently throughout the entire Course 1 capstone. (c) THE HPA resolves the capstone's fixed replica count for the backend. k8s1-12's Deployment specified a static number of replicas regardless of actual load -- meaning it was either over-provisioned (wasting cost) or under-provisioned (dropping requests) any time real traffic diverged from that fixed guess. Chapter 6's HPA replaces the static number with a target utilization percentage and a capped replica range, so the backend scales toward actual demand instead of a guess made at deploy time. WHY THIS WORKS AS AN ANSWER ------------------------------ Each addition is tied to a SPECIFIC, concrete limitation from the prior capstone (not a generic "this makes it better" claim), and (b) is correctly identified as a gap that existed even though Course 1 never explicitly flagged it -- showing the security exposure was real, not just a named-and-deferred item.