Exercise 2: Multi-Cloud as an Accident, Not Always a Strategy — Possible Solution
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Why multi-cloud is sometimes not a deliberate choice:

Per the chapter, organizations often end up running on more than one
cloud provider through circumstances rather than a single, intentional
strategic decision -- for example: an ACQUISITION brings in a company
that was already running on a different provider than the acquiring
organization's own infrastructure; different TEAMS within the same
organization independently choose different providers over time,
without central coordination; or a deliberate but narrower decision
(like risk diversification for one specific workload) results in a
second provider being adopted, without that decision ever being framed
as "we are now a multi-cloud organization" as a whole. In each of
these cases, the organization simply arrives at running on multiple
clouds as a byproduct of other decisions, rather than choosing
multi-cloud as a strategy from the outset.

The real operational cost that comes with it regardless of how it
happened:

Per the chapter, multi-cloud "adds real operational complexity... a
genuine trade-off, not a free win" -- and this cost applies EQUALLY
whether the organization arrived there deliberately or accidentally,
because the complexity comes from the technical reality of running
across providers, not from the intent behind the decision. Two
specific costs the course has already covered directly:

1. TERMINOLOGY-MAPPING FRICTION (Chapter 2) -- every service needs to
   be understood and operated across genuinely different naming and
   sometimes structurally different concepts (like Azure's Resource
   Group having no clean equivalent elsewhere), adding real cognitive
   overhead to day-to-day operations.

2. LOG QUERY LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES (Chapter 8) -- unlike SQL's broad
   portability, each provider's log query language is genuinely
   different, meaning troubleshooting skills don't transfer as
   directly across providers as they might for other kinds of
   technical knowledge.

Neither of these costs cares WHY the organization ended up
multi-cloud -- the operational burden is the same either way.

WHY THIS WORKS AS AN ANSWER
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This directly reuses the chapter's own three named causes of
accidental multi-cloud (acquisitions, uncoordinated team choices,
narrower risk-diversification decisions) and its own two named,
previously-covered costs (Ch.2 terminology friction, Ch.8 log query
differences), making the specific point the chapter itself makes: the
COST of multi-cloud is independent of whether it was chosen
deliberately or arrived at by accident.